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NEGLECTING RESPONSIBILITIES:
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE’S FAILURE TO
ADDRESS CHILD MALTREATMENT AND POVERTY
Joshua Hamlet*
When a child or adolescent passes away, parents are typically
stricken with grief and unable to cope with the devastation.
Unfortunately, the emotional toll is not the only challenge parents
face. Some are forced to handle legal battles regarding the
administration of their deceased child’s estate. Since the majority of
children do not have a will, state adoptions of the Uniform Probate
Code dictate what happens to the child’s estate during these
tragedies. But what happens in the event these parents abused or
neglected their child while that child was still living? While the
Uniform Probate Code advises that these malevolent parents should
be blocked from inheriting, it does not always work out that way in
reality. Furthermore, parents from disadvantaged socioeconomic
backgrounds are more likely to abuse their children—children who,
in turn, die intestate, creating a never-ending cycle of abuse and
legislatively-driven inheritance which fails to account for deaths
following lives marked by parental abuse or neglect. It is time to
revise the Uniform Probate Code to protect children who die
intestate so that abusive or neglectful parents will no longer be
rewarded after mistreatment.
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2020; B.A. in Business & Psychology,
University of Rochester, 2016. Thank you to my family and friends for all the
encouragement and support throughout this stressful yet rewarding process. I
would also like to thank the entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for all
your hard work and meaningful feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the unbearable pain of losing a child from an accident
or mistake of another individual. Consider having to relive that
agony daily during a wrongful death suit. Just when you think the
torment is ending because you procure a judgment against the
defendant, your ex-spouse comes out of the woodwork and claims
entitlement to the wrongful death award as the child’s other natural
parent. Despite evidence of your ex-spouse’s failure to pay child
support, anger management issues, and absence from your child’s
life, the court still holds that both parents share equally in the estate.
This is not a fictional scenario drawn up to demonstrate a potential
problem with intestate succession laws—this is Justina Nees’s
reality, one which exposes a critical flaw in the Uniform Probate
Code’s (“UPC”) approach to intestate succession for abusive or
neglectful parents.
1
Intestate succession is defined as “the method used to distribute
property owned by a person who dies without a valid will.”
2
Unfortunately, most people in the United States die without a will,
3
leaving the default rules of intestacy to govern the division of an
estate and, often, serve as “rules of law that yield to the contrary
intention of the people they are designed to regulate.”
4
The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals poignantly summarized the
purpose of intestate succession statutes in its ruling in King v.
Riffee,
5
noting that “the purpose of [intestate succession]
1
In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 209, 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2015).
2
Intestate Succession, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3
Michael R. McCunney & Alyssa A. DiRusso, Marketing Wills, 16 ELDER
L.J. 33, 34 (2008); Nick DiUlio, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Don’t Have a
Will, 2017 Survey Reveals, HUFFPOST (Feb. 17, 2017, 1:21 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/more-than-half-of-us-adults-dont-have-a-will-
new_b_58a6086ce4b0b0e1e0e2083a; Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not
Have a Will, GALLUP (May 18, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx.
4
Thomas P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement
for Same-Sex Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1515 (1999).
5
King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 89 (W. Va. 1983) (holding that the plaintiff
who was born out of wedlock could not inherit from his natural grandfather’s
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statutes . . . is to provide a distribution of real and personal property
that approximates what decedents would have done if they had made
a will.”
6
The specific goals of intestacy statutes are “(1) to protect
the [decedent’s] financially dependent family, (2) to avoid
complicating property titles and excessive subdivision of property,
(3) to promote and encourage the nuclear family, and (4) to
encourage the accumulation of property by individuals.”
7
The UPC
is a standard comprehensive act regulating the administration of
estates, adopted in varying degrees by several states. At the time of
this writing, sixteen states have enacted the UPC in its entirety,
while the majority of states have adopted portions of it.
8
Article II
of the UPC outlines the default rules of intestacy succession and
serves as a suggestive model, providing state legislatures with
guidance on how to handle intestate estates.
9
While theoretically favorable, the idea of default rules and
communal goals surrounding the law of intestate succession has
proven idealistic in practice.
10
One area that tends to cause
controversy involves abusive or neglectful parents’ ability to inherit
from their deceased children’s estates, despite maltreatment by
estate because the relevant statute only allows adopted children to inherit from
their adoptive parents).
6
Id. at 87–88.
7
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 3 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 319, 324 (1978).
8
Uniform Probate Code, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).
9
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Art. II (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
10
See In re Turpening v. Howard, 671 N.W.2d 567, 569–70 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003); Estate of McCoy ex rel. Jones v. McCoy, 988 So. 2d 929, 933 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008); In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2015); see also infra Part II (discussing states’ interpretations of their parental-
barring statutes).
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those parents.
11
UPC section 2-114 addresses exactly that issue.
12
The UPC drafters, through this section, sought to bar abusive and
neglectful parents from inheriting their children’s estates.
13
However, state courts’ interpretations of their respective states’
adaptations of this provision have led to confusion and conflicting
holdings which sometimes allow abusive or neglectful parents to
inherit from their children’s estates—often sizable in the event of a
wrongful death suit.
14
This Note seeks to review and analyze UPC section 2-114,
predominantly in the context of wrongful death suits brought on
behalf of maltreated children. It contends that the provision fails to
establish sufficiently specific standards for terminating parental
rights, leaving courts with too much discretion in deciding whether
abusive parents may inherit from their children’s estates. Further,
statistics from studies on individuals of low socioeconomic status
indicate that the UPC’s vagueness may have the effect of
disproportionately disserving maltreated children from such
backgrounds and compounding the harm they suffer, more so than
for deceased children of higher socioeconomic status. This
11
Appellees strongly contend, however, that the legislature
intended that a parent who continuously abused his child
physically, sexually, andmentally should not benefit financially
from the child’s death. We can find no basis for this conclusion,
especially where there has been no termination of parental
rights prior to the death of the child.
Crosby v. Corley, 528 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala. 1988).
12
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended
2010).
13
Id.
14
Wrongful-Death Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (A
wrongful-death action is “a lawsuit brought on behalf of a decedent’s survivors
for their damages resulting from a tortious injury that caused the decedent’s
death.”); see also Robert A. Epstein, Appellate Division Analyzes What It Means
To “Abandon” A Child “By Willfully Forsaking” Him, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
(Jan. 4, 2016), https://njfamilylaw.foxrothschild.com/2016/01/articles/child-
support/appellate-division-analyzes-what-it-means-to-abandon-a-child-by-
willfully-forsaking-him/ (showing an example of New Jersey’s attempt at
wrestling with a parental-barring statute). Compare Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at
569–70 (holding that the allegedly neglectful parent was not entitled to the child’s
estate), with Fisher, 128 A.3d at 217 (holding that the allegedly neglectful father
was entitled to the child’s estate).
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accidental harm can be circumvented through the imposition of
more clearly defined requirements for courts that interpret this UPC
provision and state legislatures that choose to codify it. It would also
be beneficial to establish an organization whose mission it is to
conduct more research on these issues of intestate succession and
assist individuals from such backgrounds in structuring fair
inheritances.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the UPC, its
intentions, and revisions made to it over time. This Part also
analyzes UPC section 2-114 and the UPC’s approach to abusive and
neglectful parents in the context of intestate succession. Part II
analyzes relevant case law that has developed around various states’
adaptations of UPC section 2-114. It shows that, while courts across
the country have faced similar inheritance issues regarding children
who suffered maltreatment by their parents, courts have adopted
different interpretations leading to drastically divergent and
inconsistent results across jurisdictional lines. Part III introduces
statistics and studies regarding household income and its
intersection with both child maltreatment and intestacy.
Additionally, it discusses wrongful death suits, as these suits are the
most common situation in which circumstances relevant to section
2-114 arise. Part IV argues that this UPC provision requires revision
and addresses the correlation between intestacy, poverty, and child
maltreatment, refuting potential counterarguments and
misconceptions regarding UPC section 2-114. Finally, Part V
provides possible solutions for the problem of inheritance by
abusive or neglectful parents, especially in the case of low income
families, proposing a mechanism for collecting data regarding child
maltreatment and socioeconomic status as well as a revised version
of UPC section 2-114 with a lessened burden of proof and
enumerated examples of abuse that would trigger non-inheritance.
I. HISTORY OF THEUNIFORM PROBATECODE
To appreciate the problems with UPC section 2-114, it is
important to understand its drafting history. An in-depth analysis
into its background reveals that the uniform act’s purpose is to
ensure that a decedent’s estate is passed along to somebody with
whom the decedent shared an emotional connection and is
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distributed on terms similar to those the decedent would have
included in a will.
15
However, litigation in states that have adopted
the UPC in some capacity has proven that this provision is not living
up to its original goal.
16
A. Historical Background
During the early 1900s, due to limited transportation and the
inability to communicate over long distances, it was more common
for families in the United States to remain in one state than move
from state to state.
17
However, when transportation and
technological developments led to increased mobility for families,
it became common for relatives to live—and die—across state lines
or on opposite sides of the nation.
18
The varying state laws regarding
probate procedures gave rise to issues involving conflicting state
laws.
19
A push for a uniform set of laws regarding family property
followed, ultimately resulting in the promulgation of the UPC 1969
by the Uniform Law Commission,
20
the first legislative attempt at
resolving inconsistent state intestacy laws and the initial step in
15
See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy
Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 188
(2006).
16
See infra Part II.
17
Joseph J. Carroll, Comment, Avoiding Backlash: The Exclusion of
Domestic Partnership Language in the 2008 Amendments to the Uniform Probate
Code and the Future for Same-Sex Intestacy Rights, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 623, 628
(2013).
18
See id. The Supreme Court would even go on to solidify the right to travel
from one state to another. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (“The word
‘travel’ is not found in the text of the Constitution. Yet the ‘constitutional right to
travel from one State to another’ is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.”
(quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))).
19
Carroll, supra note 17, at 628–69.
20
Id. at 629; see About Us, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last visited Aug. 14, 2019)
(“The Uniform Law Commission [(“ULC”)] . . . provides states with non-
partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and
stability to critical areas of state statutory law.”).
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creating a more uniform system.
21
The UPC 1969 only addressed
intestate succession, pay-on-death accounts, and wills.
22
The next major revision to the UPC came in 1990.
23
Few
changes were made to the articles regarding probate procedure, but
substantial changes were made to Article II, which covers intestate
succession, testate succession, and nonprobate transfers.
24
Today,
the UPC 1990 has been enacted in full in sixteen states,
25
while all
but a few of the remaining states have adopted it in part.
26
B. The Parent’s Right to Inherit and the Parental Bar
Article II of the UPC, titled “Intestacy, Wills, and Donative
Transfers,” provides the general rules for these categories
27
and was
developed with “public policy and family relationships” in mind.
28
UPC section 2-103 discusses the share of an intestate estate that
heirs other than a surviving spouse receive.
29
Section 2-103(a)
21
Carroll, supra note 17, at 629–30.
22
UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Art. II-III (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended
2010).
23
Carroll, supra note 17, at 630.
24
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Art. II, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1990); see also Carroll, supra note 17, at 630–31 (“[T]he 1990 UPC aimed to
refine the 1969 Uniform Probate Code’s intestacy provisions so that the intestacy
scheme reflected the realities of modern families and the wishes of decedents who
lived in such families.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
25
The sixteen states that have adopted the UPC in its entirety are Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah. Probate Code, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=a539920d-c477-44b8-84fe-b0d7b1a4cca8 (last visited
Aug. 14, 2019) (States that prefer not to adopt the entire UPC can individually
enact “acts on guardianships and conservatorships, powers of attorney, non-
probate transfers on death, estate tax apportionment, and disclaimers of property
interests.”); Uniform Probate Code, supra note 8.
26
Uniform Probate Code, supra note 8 (“In addition, numerous states have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code in an incomplete form.”).
27
UNIF. PROBATECODE, Art. II, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAWCOMM’N 2010).
28
UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Art. II, Part 1, gen. cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010).
29
Id. § 2-103.
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dictates the order in which the intestate estate is passed in the event
that there is no spouse, such that the first party to take the intestate
estate is the decedent’s descendant(s).
30
If there is no surviving
descendant, the estate goes to the decedent’s parents.
31
However, UPC section 2-114 sets forth circumstances wherein
a parent is barred from inheriting, making particular note of the
potential for parental abuse.
32
The provision states:
A parent is barred from inheriting from or through a
child of the parent if: (1) the parent’s parental rights
were terminated and the parent-child relationship
was not judicially reestablished; or (2) the child died
before reaching [eighteen] years of age and there is
clear and convincing evidence that immediately
before the child’s death the parental rights of the
parent could have been terminated under law of this
state other than this [code] on the basis of
nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or other
actions or inactions of the parent toward the child.
33
The comment to section 2-114 provides further clarification
regarding when a parent’s rights can be terminated:
Subsection (a)(2) addresses a situation in which a
parent’s parental rights were not actually terminated.
Nevertheless, a parent can still be barred from
inheriting from or through a child if the child died
before reaching [eighteen] years of age and there is
clear and convincing evidence that immediately
before the child’s death the parental rights of the
parent could have been terminated under law of this
state other than this [code], but only if those parental
rights could have been terminated on the basis of
nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or other
actions or inactions of the parent toward the child.
34
30
Id. § 2-103(a).
31
Id.
32
Id. § 2-114.
33
Id. § 2-114(a).
34
Id. § 2-114 cmt.
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Taken together, sections 2-103(a) and 2-114 appear to assume
that it is in the public’s best interest for a child’s estate to go to his
or her parents, given the improbability of a child being married or
having heirs.
35
However, this raises the question of why parents are
better suited than siblings or other “collaterals,” such as cousins, to
take a child’s estate after their death.
36
The drafters of the 1946
Model Probate Code treated siblings and parents equally when it
came to inheritance, under the belief that succession “express[es]
what the typical intestate would have wished had he expressed his
desires in the form of a will or otherwise.”
37
However, when the
UPC was created in 1969, the drafters chose to only award a child’s
estate to his or her parents
38
on the rationale that “the estate of a
minor is likely to have been derived from his parents or
grandparents.”
39
The drafters also considered parents to typically be
“geographically and emotionally closer to the decedent” and,
therefore, “more deserving” of the inheritance.
40
Despite the drafters’ belief that parents are the most deserving
of their child’s estate, section 2-114 imposes a limitation on their
ability to inherit.
41
If the UPC tries to pass property along in a way
that the decedent would have desired, it follows that an
unsupportive, neglectful, or abusive parent
42
should be unable to
inherit.
43
However, while the UPC’s section 2-114 makes a bona
35
See id. §§ 2-103(a), 2-114(a).
36
See Scalise, Jr., supra note 15, at 188.
37
Id. (quoting MODEL PROBATE CODE 22 cmt (1946)).
38
Id.
39
William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1037, 1049 (1966).
40
Scalise, Jr., supra note 15, at 189.
41
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969)
(amended 2010).
42
For purposes of this Note, the terms “abusive,” “neglectful,”
“unsupportive,” and other terms of similar import refer to the general category of
parents who maltreat their child unless specifically addressing a particular case of
abuse, neglect, or non-support.
43
See § 2-114(a);
The explanation provided for this approach was that it was both
the approach “commonly provided in statutes,” and the
distribution that most closely tracks the purpose of the intestacy
rules, i.e., to “express what the typical intestate would have
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fide attempt to ensure that these parents are unable to inherit in the
event of their child’s untimely death, the provision incorporates a
somewhat vague burden of proof and fails to provide a sufficiently
clear definition of maltreatment.
44
The 1969 version of the UPC only provided that “[i]nheritance
from or through a child by either natural parent or his [or her]
kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the
child as his [or hers], and has not refused to support the child.”
45
It
was not until 2008 that section 2-114 was revised, barring parents
who had their parental rights judicially terminated or parents who,
with “clear and convincing evidence,” could have had their parental
rights terminated before their child’s death.
46
Fitting squarely in line
with the drafters’ intent, it precludes parents with whom the child
did not have a legal relationship and parents who could have had
their legal relationship terminated on the basis of maltreatment.
47
Additionally, by adding a “clear and convincing evidence”
standard, the drafters imposed an intermediate burden of proof
between preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt.
48
The burden of proof falls on “the party seeking to terminate
parental rights.”
49
Given the drafters’ belief that parents are
emotionally closer to their child than other relatives are, this
evidentiary standard and burden of proof helps ensure that a loving
bond existed, rather than one riddled with abuse or neglect.
50
Despite the drafters’ sound intentions with the 2008 revision of
section 2-114, they opened the door to litigation surrounding
wished had he expressed his desires in the form of a will or
otherwise.”
Scalise, Jr., supra note 15, at 188 (quoting MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22 cmt
(1946)).
44
See § 2-114(a).
45
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended
1990, 2010).
46
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
47
See id.
48
Clear and Convincing Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence (last visited
Aug. 14, 2019).
49
In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
50
§ 2-114(a); see Scalise, Jr., supra note 15, at 188.
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parents’ desire to inherit from their child’s estate.
51
By failing to
clarify aspects of the new provision—such as what constitutes
nonsupport and what qualifies as sufficient evidence—the UPC
serves as an incoherent model for states that allows abusive or
neglectful parents to inherit, thereby promoting injustice and
violating the entire purpose of the uniform act.
52
II. PROBLEMS WITH THEUPC’S PARENTAL-BARRING PROVISION
AND STATES’ ADOPTIONS THEREOF
While the drafters of the UPC tried to combat potential problems
through multiple amendments over time, issues have inevitably
arisen with regard to intestacy, leaving the doors open for courts to
broadly read the UPC or UPC-derivative statutes and make critical
decisions grounded in disparate interpretations.
53
The UPC’s lack of
specificity in both its burden of proof and definitions of
maltreatment has allowed courts too much discretion in their
interpretation, permitting some neglectful or abusive parents to
inherit from their children’s estates.
54
The latitude of the courts’
discretion, combined with the ambiguous wording of UPC section
2-114, creates excessive uncertainty that must be resolved to provide
deceased children and former victims of parental abuse with the
justice they deserve.
55
51
§ 2-114(a); see infra Part II.
52
See infra Part II.
53
See In re Turpening v. Howard, 671 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003); Estate of McCoy ex rel. Jones v. McCoy, 988 So. 2d 929, 933 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008); Perry v. Williams, 70 P.3d 1283, 1286 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
54
See § 2-114; see also Crosby v. Corley, 528 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala. 1988)
(allowing an allegedly abusive parent to inherit because there was no termination
of parental rights prior to the child’s death); In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d 203,
215–16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (allowing an allegedly neglectful parent
to inherit because of a distinction between having “abandoned” and “willfully
forsak[en]” the child).
55
See § 2-114; see also Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at 569–70 (looking at the
language of a parental-barring statute to determine whether a parent can inherit);
McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 932–33 (holding that an incarcerated parent “in fact refused
to support” his daughter because he made no attempt to provide financial support
no matter how minimal and that emotional support is irrelevant under the statute);
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A. Michigan and Mississippi Cases as Examples of
Disparate Interpretations of Nearly Identical Parental-
Bar Provisions Modeled After the UPC
In the case of In re Turpening v. Howard, the Michigan Court of
Appeals interpreted language from the state’s parental-barring
statute, Michigan Compiled Laws section 700.2114(4)—its version
of UPC section 2-114.
56
For thirty years, Respondent Russell
Howard neglected his now-deceased daughter Dawn Marie
Turpening, claiming he did not know she existed “despite evidence
to the contrary.”
57
Specifically, the decedent’s grandmother testified
that she had asked Howard to support Dawn Marie’s mother, but he
refused to do so.
58
The court looked to Michigan Compiled Laws
section 700.2114(4), which provides that “[i]nheritance from or
through a child by either natural parent or his or her kindred is
precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the child as
his or hers, and has not refused to support the child.”
59
For a natural
parent to be considered for intestate succession, both prongs must
be satisfied such that (1) the parent “must show that he openly held
the decedent out as his child, and (2) [he must show] that he did not
refuse to support [the child].”
60
Since this was a case of first
impression, the issue before the court involved analysis of the
phrases (1) “openly treated the child as his” and (2) “has not refused
to support the child.”
61
The court attempted to interpret the statute’s
intent and the definitions of its language according to the Michigan
Perry, 70 P.3d at 1285 (determining whether prior state case law “correctly states
the law” to decide whether a neglectful parent can inherit).
56
Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at 568. “This is a case of first impression. MCL
700.2114(4) and Michigan case law do not define the phrases ‘openly treated the
child as his, or ‘has not refused to support the child.’ To determine the statute’s
intent, the specific language of the statute must be examined.” Id. (quoting MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(4) (West 2019)); Case of First Impression,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (A “case of first impression” is “[a]
case that presents the court with an issue of law that has not previously been
decided by any controlling legal authority in that jurisdiction.”).
57
Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at 569.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 568 (quoting § 700.2114(4)).
60
Id.
61
Id. (citing § 700.2114(4)).
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Compiled Laws
62
but was unsuccessful in reaching an interpretive
conclusion.
63
The court then looked to other states’ interpretations of similar
statutes.
64
On the first prong regarding openly treating the child as
the parent’s: the Court of Appeals of Utah determined that its own
statute’s requirement that the parent “openly held the decedent out
as his child” required that a father “held the child out to the public
or his family as his own, developed a custom of visiting the child at
the mother’s home, or accepted the child into his home for
occasional brief visits.”
65
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court
in Bullock v. Thomas held that “to acknowledge a child from time to
time as one’s own is not synonymous with openly treating the child
as [one’s] own.”
66
Given these standards, in a case like Turpening,
Howard’s nonexistent relationship with his daughter would not rise
to the level necessary to be classified as treating his child as his
own.
67
To determine the meaning of the second prong regarding refusal
to support the child, the court in Turpening heard Howard’s
argument that the Michigan court adopt the Supreme Court of
Alabama’s approach in House v. Campbell.
68
In Campbell, the
62
Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1201 (2019) (“This act shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote . . . the following: (a) To simplify and
clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, [and] . . . (d) To make the law
uniform among the various jurisdictions, both within and outside of this state.”);
§ 700.2114(4) (requiring a parent to “openly treat” the child as his or hers and
requiring the parent to not refuse the child support in order to be allowed to
inherit); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.602(a) (2019) (defining “child” as “a person
under 18 years of age”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.622(f) (2019) (defining “child”
also as “a person under 18 years of age”).
63
The court in Turpening looked to the definition of “child” as defined in
MCL 700.1103(f), but it had no relevance to the issue at hand. The court then
turned to the definition of “child” under the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention
Act and the Child Protection law, but once again was unable to reach a
conclusion. Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at 568.
64
See id.
65
Id. at 568–59 (quoting Estate of Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70, 75 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989)).
66
Id. at 569 (citing Bullock v. Thomas, 659 So. 2d 574, 577 (Miss. 1995)).
67
Id. at 568–69.
68
Id. at 569.
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Alabaman court made a distinction between a “refusal” to provide
support and a “failure” to do so, where a “refusal” involves an act of
will, a decision to not support, whereas a “failure” could be an act
of “inevitable necessity.”
69
The probate court found that Howard
refused to support the decedent rather than having failed to do so.
70
Howard contended that the only way he could have been required to
support the child would have been if the mother filed for child
support.
71
The Michigan court rejected his argument, stating that a
father can support his child without a court ordering him to do so
72
and decided that Howard’s actions amounted to a refusal to support
the decedent child:
The decedent’s grandmother testified at length that
she asked respondent [Howard] on numerous
occasions to help the decedent’s mother with support
of the decedent. Each time respondent denied that the
decedent was his child. Following the court’s
definition of “refuse,” which is to deny, the probate
court was correct in interpreting respondent’s denial
as a refusal on his part to support the decedent.
73
Ultimately, the court decided that the Michigan statute is clear, and
since Howard did not present evidence proving that he supported or
treated his daughter as his own while she was alive, he was unable
to inherit upon her death.
74
Similarly, Mississippi also attempted to decode its parental-
barring statute.
75
In Estate of McCoy ex rel. Jones v. McCoy, the
Mississippi Court of Appeals asked whether incarcerated father
Irvin McCoy “refused or neglected support” to his daughter
Jakayla.
76
While McCoy was serving a nine-year sentence for
selling cocaine, Jakayla tragically drowned in a neighbor’s pool and
69
Id. (citing House v. Campbell, 628 So. 2d 448, 450 (Ala. 1993)).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 569–70.
75
See Estate of McCoy ex rel Jones v. McCoy, 988 So. 2d 929, 932–33
(Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
76
Id. at 932; seeMISS. CODEANN. § 91-1-15(3) (West 2019).
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died.
77
Following Jakayla’s death, her mother Erika Jones filed a
wrongful death suit, ultimately leading to a $100,000 settlement.
78
Jones filed for a determination of her daughter’s heirs at law in order
to disinherit McCoy.
79
The Chancery Court examined Mississippi
Code section 91-1-15(3)(d), which states in relevant part, “The
natural father of an illegitimate and his kindred shall not inherit: (i)
from or through the child unless the father has openly treated the
child as his, and has not refused or neglected to support the child.”
80
The court ultimately ruled that, since McCoy did not refuse or
neglect to support Jakayla, he was able to inherit from his
daughter.
81
The chancellor reasoned that, because McCoy was not a
free man, it rendered him unable to support Jakayla, drawing the
same distinction between “refusing” and “failing” as in Bullock.
82
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding
that McCoy still could have tried to support his daughter using the
monetary donations he was given by family members while
incarcerated, even if they did not comprise a significant sum.
83
McCoy tried to argue that he supported Jakayla in other ways,
including: (1) “providing companionship to [Jones] throughout the
majority of her pregnancy with Jakayla, and by babysitting
[Jakayla’s half-brother], (2) by allowing Jones and Jakayla to visit
him in prison, (3) by requesting that his parents take care of Jakayla,
and (4) by asking his mother to purchase an outfit for Jakayla to be
pictured in.”
84
However, the appellate court rejected any possibility
of accepting emotional support as adequate support under the
statute, stating, “We find it highly unlikely that the Legislature
contemplated the ‘non-financial support’ listed above as ‘supporting
the child.’”
85
The Court of Appeals held that monetary support is the
77
McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 930.
78
Id. at 930–31.
79
Id. at 930.
80
§ 91-1-15 (West 2019);McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 931–32.
81
McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 930.
82
Id. at 932.
83
Id. at 932–33.
84
Id. at 932.
85
Id. at 933.
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preferred method of child support, even when a parent is
incarcerated.
86
The disparate outcomes in Michigan and Mississippi came from
inconsistent interpretations of the statutory language, despite the
states having nearly identical parental-barring statutes, both
modelled after the UPC.
87
Divergent outcomes like those in
Turpening and McCoy are a consequence of a lack of specificity in
the UPC’s model language—a flaw which permits inconsistent
decisions nationwide and subverts the goal of achieving the UPC
drafters’ intent uniformly across the state courts. It is the lack of a
clear definition or example of “nonsupport” or “inactions” in section
2-114 that forces state courts to look to other sources in determining
whether or not a parent is barred from inheriting, creating
problematic vagueness that can lead to these drastically different
conclusions.
88
B. Courts Are Excessively Deferential in Parental-Barring
Inheritance Cases
Moreover, both Turpening and McCoy automatically dismiss or
accept certain arguments without explanation.
89
For instance, the
court in McCoy had no issue rejecting the idea that “non-financial
support” could constitute “support[ing] the child;” the majority
simply provided that it did not believe the legislature would consider
otherwise.
90
However, a further look into the Mississippi Code
86
See id.
87
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also
In re Turpening v. Howard, 671 N.W.2d 567, 568–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that a neglectful parent could not inherit based on the “clear” meaning
of the statute despite the “lack of guidance” under Michigan law); McCoy, 988
So. 2d at 933 (holding that an incarcerated father could not inherit because of a
distinction between “refusing to support” and a “failure to support”).
88
See Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at 569–70;McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 933.
89
Turpening, 671 N.W.2d at 570 (“Here, the statute’s meaning is clear that
a natural parent is barred from inheriting except if the natural parent ‘openly
treated the child as his’ and ‘has not refused to support the child.’” (citation
omitted)); McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 933 (“We find it highly unlikely that the
Legislature contemplated the ‘non-financial support’ listed above as ‘supporting
the child.’”).
90
McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 933.
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sections governing trusts and estates suggests a different
conclusion.
91
The court in McCoy was properly concerned with Mississippi
Code section 91-1-15, discussing descent among illegitimates,
92
because McCoy was the illegitimate father of Jakayla.
93
However,
section 91-1-15 does not define “support,” nor does it allude to what
the legislature intended support to mean.
94
The court failed to
consider other sections of the Code to explore the legislature’s true
intent.
95
Mississippi Code section 93-15-121 governs the grounds
for termination of parental rights for “natural parents.”
96
While there
is some discussion of financial-related support such as “clothing,
shelter or medical care,” there is recognition of aspects related to
emotional support.
97
It provides that a parent’s rights may be
terminated if the parent “failed to exercise reasonable visitation or
communication with the child;” was convicted of offenses such as
rape, sexual battery, or exploitation of the child; or if “the parent’s
abusive or neglectful conduct has caused, at least in part, an extreme
and deep-seated antipathy by the child toward the parent.”
98
These
factors are more concerned with the child’s mental well-being than
with financial support, which should at least merit a discussion
91
SeeMISS. CODEANN. § 91-1-15 (West 2019); MISS. CODEANN. § 93-15-
121 (West 2019).
92
§ 91-1-15(1)(c) (‘“Illegitimate’ means a person who at the time of his birth
was born to natural parents not married to each other and said person was not
legitimized by subsequent marriage of said parents or legitimized through a proper
judicial proceeding.”).
93
McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 931–32; see § 91-1-15(3).
94
§ 91-1-15.
95
See McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 929.
96
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-121 (West 2019); see § 91-1-15(1) (‘“Natural
parents’ means the biological mother or father of the illegitimate.”).
97
§ 93-15-121(d).
The parent has failed to exercise reasonable visitation or
communicationwith the child; . . . The parent has committed an
abusive act for which reasonable efforts to maintain the children
in the home would not be required under § 43-21-603, or a
series of physically,mentally, or emotionally abusive incidents,
against the child.
§ 93-15-121(e), (g) (emphasis added).
98
§ 93-15-121(e)–(f), (h).
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about whether the legislature intended “non-financial support” to be
deemed support in any parental-barring suit.
99
Additionally, the comment to UPC section 2-114 specifically
references Mississippi Code section 93-15-103 as a statute that
“provid[es] the grounds for termination of parental rights,” making
it a relevant consideration for the court in determining whether
McCoy’s rights were terminated.
100
While these findings do not
constitute definitive proof that section 91-1-15 is meant to consider
non-financial support, they warrant a discussion about whether
McCoy’s compassion for his daughter should be relevant in
determining support. AssumingMcCoy’s examples of non-financial
support are true, an argument can be made that he was “openly
treating the child as his” and had a valid basis to inherit from
Jakayla’s estate.
101
Further blurring the reasoning applied to statutory interpretation
is that courts sometimes accept certain contentions as truthful with
little reasoning to support them.
102
In Turpening, the Michigan
Court of Appeals looked to the Michigan Compiled Laws “to
simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents.”
103
It is well established that, if a statute is clear and unambiguous,
courts are bound to apply it as it is written.
104
The majority in
Turpening decided that the statute was clear: because the father
provided no evidence of treating his daughter “as his own,” he was
99
See id.; see also McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 933 (rejecting the idea that the
legislature intended for a non-financial interpretation).
100
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114, cmt (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
101
MISS. CODEANN. § 91-1-15 (West 2019); see also McCoy, 988 So. 2d at
932 (discussing a father trying to support his daughter through non-financial
means such as visitation).
102
See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons:
A Comparative Law Approach, 72WASH. &LEEL.REV. 483, 484 (2015) (arguing
that “judges sometimes have reasons not to give reasons”); Richard A. Posner,
Judicial Opinion Writing: Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447 (1995) (“In thinking about a case, a judge might come to
a definite conclusion yet find the conclusion indefensible when he tries to write
an opinion explaining and justifying it.”).
103
See In re Turpening v. Howard, 671 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003).
104
Id. (citing In reMesser Trust, 579 N.W.2d 73, 76–77 (Mich. 1998)).
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barred from inheriting from his daughter.
105
It is paradoxical that the
Michigan court held that this statute was clear and unambiguous
after several pages of discussion attempting to interpret it.
106
In fact,
if the statute were as clear as the court held it to be, it likely would
not have been challenged in a debate over its true meaning. Because
this was a case of first impression
107
the court’s blind acceptance of
the statute’s meaning now serves as the basis for any future cases
that arise around this topic.
108
Irrespective of the court’s decision,
one thing is clear: this state’s court came to a conclusion it may not
have come to if the UPC provided state legislatures with clearer
guidance on parental support.
The current ambiguities allow courts significant power and
discretion when interpreting these statutes, which can lead to
inconsistent results. It is exactly this inconsistency that undermines
the UPC’s goal of “uniformity among state family property laws”
and prevents justice for the decedents.
109
C. Some Parental-Bar Statutes Allow Courts to Implement
Heightened Standards, Making Termination of Parental
Rights Difficult
Some states have chosen to amend their state-level adaptations
of UPC section 2-114 to include a mental state requirement for the
alleged abuser, making it more difficult for the moving party to
terminate the other’s parental rights.
110
This requirement raises the
moving party’s burden of proof, imposing significant obstacles on
the termination of parental rights and frustrating the purpose of UPC
105
See id. at 569–70 (citingMICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2114(4) (West 2019)).
106
See id. 568–70 (“Here, the statute’s meaning is clear that a natural parent
is barred from inheriting except if the natural parent ‘openly treated the child as
his’ and ‘has not refused to support the child.’” (citation omitted)).
107
Id. at 568.
108
See In re Bierkle v. Umble, 314 Mich. App. 667, 647–75 (Mich. Ct. App.
2016); In re Estate of Casey v. Keene, 306 Mich. App. 252, 259 (Mich. Ct. App.
2014); In re Daniels Estate, 837 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
109
Carroll, supra note 17, at 629–30.
110
In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
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section 2-114 by ignoring what can reasonably be understood as the
decedent’s wishes.
111
The New Jersey precedent of In re Estate of Fisher allows a
court to set a high standard as a barrier to blocking a parent’s
recovery.
112
There, fifteen-year old Michael Fisher II passed away
allegedly due to a wrongful act by his physicians.
113
Michael had a
congenital heart murmur and collapsed while playing hockey, even
though a cardiologist approved “unrestricted” activity three weeks
prior to the incident.
114
His parents Michael Fisher, Sr. and Justina
Nees had separated in 2001 and were eligible to share equally in
their child’s estate in accordance with New Jersey Statute section
3B:5-4(b).
115
After their son’s death, Nees filed a complaint to bar
Fisher from inheriting because New Jersey Statute section 3B:5-
14.1 precludes the parent of a decedent from inheriting through
intestate succession if “[t]he parent refused to acknowledge the
decedent or abandoned the decedent when the decedent was a
minor by willfully forsaking the decedent.”
116
In her complaint, Nees
alleged that Fisher abandoned his son after their divorce and failed
to pay child support.
117
The trial court barred Fisher from inheriting
because the evidence showed his actions and inactions constituted
“willful forsaking” as required by the statute.
118
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, reversed.
119
Citing various cases and New Jersey
111
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-14.1(b)(1) (West 2019), with UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
112
Fisher, 128 A.3d at 216–17.
113
Id. at 206–08.
114
Martin Deangelis, Dennis Township Teen Dies While Playing Hockey;
Medical Condition May Have Contributed, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY (Sept. 26,
2010),
https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/communities/upper_capemay/dennis-
township-teen-dies-while-playing-hockey-medical-condition-
may/article_fa01ae12-c8da-11df-8ffc-001cc4c002e0.html.
115
N.J. STAT. ANN § 3B:5-4(b) (West 2019); Fisher, 128 A.3d at 207–08.
116
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-14.1 (West 2019) (emphasis added); Fisher, 128
A.3d at 207–08.
117
§ 3B:5-14.1; Fisher, 128 A.3d at 208.
118
Fisher, 128 A.3d at 208–09.
119
Id. at 217.
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inheritance statutes,
120
the court established that a party moving to
bar a parent from inheritance must demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the non-moving parent “through his or her
unambiguous and intentional conduct, has clearly manifested a
settled purpose to permanently forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child.”
121
The lower court judge
had only focused on actions which determined that Fisher
“abandoned” his son, concluding that he made intentional actions to
do so.
122
However, the appellate court explained:
[T]hat is only part of the test under New Jersey
Statute section 3B:5-14.1(b)(1). As we hold in this
opinion, the issue is whether Fisher clearly
manifested a settled purpose to permanently forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
to the child. That purpose was not demonstrated
here.
123
Nees’s evidence “did not preponderate in favor of a finding that [the
father] ‘abandoned’ his son ‘by willfully forsaking him.’”
124
Facing
the high standard that imposed a more burdensome mental state,
Nees’s success in the lower court was reversed, and Fisher was
permitted to inherit.
125
Cases such as Fisher demonstrate the vital role that the burden
of proof plays in determining parents’ ability to inherit from their
child’s estate.
126
While the UPC only requires “clear and convincing
evidence that immediately before the child’s death the parental
rights of the parent could have been terminated” to bar inheritance,
New Jersey takes a harsher stance that involves the abusive parent’s
“unambiguous and intentional conduct” and “clear manifest[ation
120
See § 3B:5-14.1(b)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (West 2019); State v. N.I.,
793 A.2d 760, 768 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (defining “forsaking” as
“permanent giving up or relinquishment of the child”); State v. Burden, 315 A.2d
43, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (defining “willfully” as “intentionally or
purposely as distinguished from inadvertently or accidentally”).
121
Fisher, 128 A.3d at 214.
122
Id. at 208–09.
123
Id. at 216.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 209, 214, 217.
126
Id. at 214–15.
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of] a settled purpose to permanently forego all parental duties
determined by a preponderance of the evidence.”
127
The UPC
drafters should implement a lower burden of proof such that states
would be dissuaded from deviation or implementation of more
burdensome requirements like those in New Jersey that neglect a
decedent’s implied desires.
128
D. Some Parental-Bar Statutes Fail to Direct Courts
Regarding the Appropriate Standard of Proof
Not all courts choose to impose a higher standard of proof to
prevent one parent from inheriting.
129
In Perry v. Williams, the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico specifically declined to use a
heightened burden of proof when making a decision about the
formal termination of parental rights.
130
In this case, Wanda Perry’s
fourteen-year-old son Curtis died of leukemia after which she
obtained a $463,332 settlement from a wrongful death claim against
the University of New Mexico Hospital.
131
Perry petitioned to
terminate the father Zollie Williams’s parental rights on grounds of
abandonment and neglect because Williams paid less than $200 in
child support throughout Curtis’s life and had little contact with his
child.
132
New Mexico has codified the UPC’s parental-barring
provision
133
as Annotated Statutes of New Mexico section 45-2-
114,
134
which the court cited as evidence that New Mexico has a
public policy against rewarding parents who neglect their
children.
135
Williams contended that the trial court failed to use the
127
Fisher, 128 A.3d at 214–15; see UNIF. PROBATECODE § 2-114(a) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2010).
128
See Fisher, 128 A.3d at 215; Carroll, supra note 17.
129
See Perry v. Williams, 70 P.3d 1283, 1286 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
130
Id.
131
Perry, 70 P.3d at 1284.
132
Id. at 1284–85.
133
CompareN.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114 (West 2019),withUNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993).
134
§ 45-2-114.
135
The Probate Code prohibits a natural parent from inheriting
through a child if that parent has not openly treated the child as
the parent’s own and has refused to support the child. It is
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standard of “clear and convincing evidence” in their ruling against
his recovery, but the appellate court dismissed that argument based
on prior New Mexico common law
136
and the legislature’s intent,
137
which were enough to bar Williams’s chance at recovery.
138
Perry represents the end of the spectrum opposite that of Fisher
in meeting burden of proof requirements in inheritance cases.
139
If
the goal of intestacy statutes is truly “to provide a distribution of real
and personal property that approximates what decedents would have
done had they made a will,”
140
then the UPC’s standard should be
less demanding (such as a preponderance of the evidence standard)
to facilitate proving that maltreatment was inflicted on the decedent
prior to death. New Jersey used a preponderance of the evidence
standard in combination with a stricter mental state, creating an
therefore readily seen that NewMexico does not look favorably
upon parents who do not support their children, and it does not
allow those parents to profit through probate from a child’s
death.
Perry, 70 P.3d at 1289 (internal citation omitted).
136
See Dominguez v. Rogers, 673 P.2d 1338, 1342 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(“Proof of natural-parent status is not necessarily sufficient for recovery under the
wrongful death statute.”).
137
Our task in this case is to determine whether the language in
Dominguez correctly states the law. In doing so, we strive to
implement the Wrongful Death Act in the manner intended by
the legislature. We do so against a backdrop of the NewMexico
common law, as well as the common law and statutes from
other jurisdictions. In addition, we have a wealth of recent
statutory changes that express our legislature’s view on the
public policy issues raised by this case. Our holding that
Dominguez is well supported and consistent with legislative
intent is sufficient for us to affirm the trial court’s ruling barring
Father’s recovery on the facts of this case, which are undisputed
and unchallenged. Thus, we need not address in detail Father’s
arguments about . . . clear and convincing evidence.
Perry, 70 P.3d at 1286.
138
Id.; see also Dominguez, 673 P.2d at 1339 (1983) (“We hold that the
wrongful death statute does not confer on appellant an unconditional right to
intervene.”).
139
See supra Section II.C (explaining that New Jersey used a burdensome
mental state to block a parent from inheriting).
140
King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87–88 (W. Va. 1983); see Clear and
Convincing Evidence, supra note 48.
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environment far more permissive of neglectful parents’ inheritances
and demonstrative of heightened difficulties in establishing that a
parent has relinquished parental rights.
141
In contrast, New Mexico
declined to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard.
142
The
UPC is focused on creating a uniform standard, but its goal is
constrained by the disparate burdens states impose on moving
parties.
143
While New Mexico’s approach of rejecting a clear and
convincing evidence standard succeeded in blocking a neglectful
father from inheriting from his child’s estate, the court failed to
provide a rationale for its decision, setting precedent that another
court could potentially cite to allow an abusive or neglectful parent
to inherit.
144
For example, while the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico rejected a higher standard without much rationale, another
court could, likewise, use this as persuasive authority to reject a
lower standard, still providing little rationale, allowing an abusive
parent to inherit.
145
As a nationally recommended model for the
states,
146
the UPC should be clarified and further recommendations
should be implemented in order to make the intestacy process easier
for courts and more fair to litigants.
III. TARGETS OF INTESTACY ANDMALTREATMENT
As Article II of the UPC concerns intestacy,
147
it is important to
recognize which groups of people typically die intestate. The results
of studies analyzing the relationships between various
demographics and intestacies show that individuals who are young
and those with lower incomes are much more likely to die
141
See In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 216–17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2015). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-14.1 (West 2019), with UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
142
Perry, 70 P.3d at 1286.
143
Id. at 1284–85; Fisher, 128 A.3d at 217; Carroll, supra note 17, at 624–
25.
144
See Perry, 70 P.3d at 1287.
145
See id.
146
Carroll, supra note 17, at 624–25.
147
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1990) (amended
2010).
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intestate.
148
Furthermore, studies have shown a correlation between
low socioeconomic status
149
and child maltreatment,
150
and that
accidents
151
are one of the leading causes of death for younger
individuals in the United States.
152
While it is critical to note that
this information is not causally linked,
153
it shows that younger
individuals of a lower socioeconomic level are more likely to be
impacted by the effects of section 2-114 of the UPC due to patterns
148
See Fellows et al, supra note 7, at 338 (1978); Alyssa A. DiRusso,
Comment, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic
Status, 23 QUINN. PROB. LAW J. 36, 51–52 (2009).
149
See Measuring Socioeconomic Status and Subjective Social Status, AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/class/measuring-status
(last visited Aug. 14, 2019); see also Poverty Guidelines, OFF. ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines
(last visited Aug. 14, 2019) (showing that socioeconomic status is a collective
measure of variables including education, income, occupation, family size, and
relationships). For purposes of this Note, unless otherwise specified,
“socioeconomic status” is a measurement of income, educational attainment, and
occupational prestige. Individuals with “low socioeconomic status” are those who
completed the least amount of schooling, fall below the poverty threshold (as of
February 1, 2019, the poverty guideline for a single head of household is $12,490),
and are unemployed. Id.
150
See JOHN ECKENRODE ET AL., INCOME INEQUALITY AND CHILD
MALTREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 453 (2014),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7cb9/1ffc316bfdb9b87b3d0ba5a41c3113c80ce7
.pdf?_ga=2.143286448.440197508.1566493486-202153602.1566493486; U.S.
DEP’T OFHEALTH&HUMANSERVS, ADMIN. FORCHILDREN&FAMILIES, FOURTH
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT
TO CONGRESS 11–12 (2010),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report_congress_full_pdf_j
an2010.pdf.
151
See SHERRY L.MURPHY, B.S. ET AL., DEATHS: FINALDATA FOR 2015 43
(2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr66/nvsr66_06.pdf (defining, for
purposes of this study, “accidents” across multiple categories: motor vehicle
accidents; falls; accidental discharge of firearms; accidental drowning and
submersion; accidental hanging, strangulation, and suffocation; accidental
exposure to smoke, fire, and flames; and accidental poisoning and exposure to
noxious substances).
152
Id. at 1–2.
153
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 51 (2009) (“The data also reveal a very strong
correlation between testacy and age.”); see ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at
454 (“This study is the first to demonstrate that increases in income inequality are
associated with increases in child maltreatment rates at the county level.”).
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of maltreatment and accidental deaths among these demographics,
giving rise to the likelihood of both wrongful death actions and
parental-barring motions.
154
A. Effect of Age on Intestacy
Research in a 2009 study on intestacy among various
demographics demonstrated that older individuals are more likely to
have wills than younger individuals.
155
Specifically, fewer than 7%
of individuals under the age of thirty in the study’s population had a
will, compared with the 87% of those over the age of seventy,
156
suggesting that younger individuals are not as concerned about
estate planning as older generations.
157
Similarly, younger people
may not be not as worried about death simply because of their age
and their estates’ limited sizes.
158
No matter the reason, there is
evidence that younger individuals are much more likely to die
intestate compared to their older counterparts.
159
B. Income’s Effect on Intestacy and the Importance of
Wrongful Death Actions
Like older individuals, individuals with higher incomes are also
less likely to die intestate than those with lower incomes.
160
A 1978
study
161
revealed that only 38.8% of those with a family income
154
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
155
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 51–52.
156
Id. at 52.
157
Id. at 54.
158
Alessandra Malito, Young and Single? You Still Need a Will, MKT.
WATCH (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:12 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/young-
and-single-you-still-need-a-will-2017-08-02 (“You don’t need a house or kids to
have these documents . . . . As a generation, millennials are often maligned for
being bad with money and reluctant to grow up—but they still probably need a
will.”).
159
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 52.
160
Id. at 50.
161
Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 338.
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under $8,000 had a will,
162
while 65.4% of those with family income
over $25,000 had a will.
163
It has remained true that those with
higher incomes are more likely to have a will than those of lower
income levels, as shown by a 2009 study by Professor of LawAlyssa
A. DiRusso.
164
Her study demonstrated that only 18.5% of people
with an income of $25,000 or less had a will, whereas 40.4% of
people who had wills had incomes over $100,000.
165
This testacy
status difference was found to be statistically significant and the
most dramatic at lower income levels.
166
In other words, as income
increased, the disparity between income levels was not as striking—
and while there was little discrepancy between the middle and high
income groups, there was a significant difference between the
lowest income individuals and those in the middle or high-income
groups.
167
Some individuals with lower incomes may die without a will
because they struggled to get by at those income levels, never mind
save up enough money to pass anything down to an heir.
168
However, if the individual were to die due to the acts of another, the
family members of the decedent could bring a wrongful death suit
to recover damages.
169
In 2015, accidents or unintentional injuries
were the fourth leading cause of death, with a total of 146,571
accidental deaths in the United States.
170
Of these deaths, 1,235 were
of children between ages one and four; 1,518 were of children
between five and fourteen; and 12,514 were of those between ages
fifteen and twenty-four.
171
These statistics put accidents as the
leading cause of death amongst these age groups, constituting 45.6%
162
Note that $8,000 as of December 1978 has the same buying power as
$29,883.01 in October 2018. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STATS.,
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).
163
See Fellows et al., supra note 7.
164
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 50.
165
Id. at 51.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 338; DiRusso, supra note 148, at 50.
169
Wrongful-Death Action, supra note 14.
170
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 151, at 6.
171
Id. at 33.
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of total accidental or unintentional deaths in the United States.
172
Information about awards and settlements is scattered; many
wrongful death cases are settled before they reach trial, perhaps to
avoid the emotional distress associated with litigation.
173
For
example, unarmed eighteen-year-old Michael Brown was killed by
an officer in Ferguson, Missouri; his family reached a $1.5 million
wrongful death settlement against the city.
174
In San Jose,
California, fifteen-year-old Audrie Pott committed suicide after
bullying by her classmates, leading to a $950,000 wrongful death
settlement.
175
Even if someone’s personal estate is limited—
presumably as a child’s would be—there is still potential for a
wrongful death suit’s conclusion with immense disbursements.
176
C. Correlation Between Income and Maltreatment
It is critical to examine the children who face maltreatment by
their parents to understand the discrepancies among abuse patterns
at different socioeconomic levels. A 2018 study done by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services examining child
maltreatment cases between 1990 and 2016 revealed the erratic
nature of these cases, increasing during some time periods and
decreasing during others.
177
The number of child maltreatment cases
peaked around 1994, with an average of fifteen incidents per 1,000
172
See id. at 36.
173
Catherine J. Byerly, Wrongful Death Claims and Settlements, ANNUITY
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.annuity.org/structured-settlements/wrongful-death-
claims/.
174
Michael Brown’s Family Receives $1.5 Million Settlement in Wrongful
Death Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2017, 2:50 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-brown-ferguson-missouri-settlement-
wrongful-death-lawsuit/.
175
Julia Prodis Sulek, San Jose: Boys in Audrie Pott Case Apologize in
Wrongful-Death Lawsuit Settlement, MERCURYNEWS (April 3, 2015, 7:42 AM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/04/03/san-jose-boys-apologize-in-
wrongful-death-lawsuit-settlement-over-girls-suicide/.
176
See supra notes 174–175.
177
See Child Maltreatment, CHILD TRENDS,
https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/child-maltreatment (last visited Aug. 14,
2019).
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children.
178
Between 2005 and 2006, approximately three million
children under the age of eighteen were either “physically abused,
sexually abused, physically neglected, or emotionally abused.”
179
In
2015, the National Children’s Alliance reported that approximately
700,000 children are abused in the United States each year.
180
Incident rates have been on the rise since 2012.
181
As of 2017, the
incidence rate was about nine incidents per 1,000 children.
182
According to a study conducted by professors at Cornell
University, higher income inequality corresponds with higher rates
of child maltreatment.
183
The Fourth National Incidence Study
examined the link between socioeconomic status and child
maltreatment.
184
The study analyzed socioeconomic status in terms
of a combination of “household income, household participation in
any poverty program, and parents’ education.”
185
If a household was
in the lowest tier of any one of these indicators, it was deemed to be
one of low socioeconomic status.
186
When compared to their higher
socioeconomic status counterparts, it was revealed that children in
low socioeconomic households were three times more likely to be
abused and almost seven times as likely to be neglected.
187
The
researchers hypothesized that these results were related to income
inequality’s “negative impact on health and well-being for both
adults and children” but noted that there has not been a study
specifically examining the association of income inequality with
178
Id.
179
ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 455.
180
National Statistics on Child Abuse, NAT’L CHILD. ALLIANCE (2014),
https://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/media-room/nca-digital-media-
kit/national-statistics-on-child-abuse/.
181
See Child Maltreatment, supra note 177.
182
Id.
183
ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 454.
184
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, supra note 150, at 11.
185
See id. at 12.
186
Id. (“Household income below $15,000 a year, parents’ highest education
level less than high school, or any member of the household a participant in a
poverty program, such as TANF, food stamps, public housing, energy assistance,
or subsidized school meals.”).
187
ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 455.
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child maltreatment.
188
Overall, while there has not been a conclusive
study done in this area, these statistics reveal that individuals who
are younger, as well as those from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds, are more at risk of dying intestate,
189
from an
accident,
190
and suffering from parental maltreatment during their
lives.
191
This, in turn, can give rise to a situation where UPC section
2-114’s influence is triggered and state courts are forced to wrestle
with the effects of an imperfect uniform act.
192
IV. MISCONCEPTIONSABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
PARENTALBAR ANDCOUNTERARGUMENTS
Despite all of these powerful statistics,
193
the unsettled case
law,
194
and disturbing correlations that show a plausible connection
between child maltreatment and accidental deaths at varying
socioeconomic levels,
195
advocates of the current UPC might argue
that it is effective as drafted and there is no need for revision.
196
While this may be true with regard to certain provisions of the UPC,
there are clearly circumstances where abusive or neglectful parents
are still able to inherit despite provisions like section 2-114.
197
Therefore, to effectuate a policy that respects children who die
intestate after suffering years of parental abuse or neglect, a revision
188
Id.
189
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 52–54.
190
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 151, at 28. See generally William S.
Nersesian, et al., Childhood Death and Poverty: A Study of All Childhood Deaths
in Maine, 1976 to 1980, 75 PEDIATRICS 41 (1985) (noting that children from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds were at a higher risk of accidental deaths).
191
ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 454–55.
192
See supra Part II.
193
See supra Sections III.A & III.B.
194
See supra Part II.
195
See supra Section III.C.
196
See Joe C. Foster, Jr., A Michigan Lawyer’s View on Michigan Probate
Reform, 12 PROB. L.J. OHIO 32, 32 (2001) (“The [UPC] . . . as enacted in
Michigan, works. Decedents’ estates are probated faster, cheaper, more simply
and with more privacy, using informal proceedings, and going to court only when
there is a dispute or guidance is needed.”).
197
See Crosby v. Corley, 528 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala. 1988); In re Estate of
Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
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that considers the disparate impacts of socioeconomic status and the
need for a clear burden of proof is necessary.
198
A. “Bad” Parents are Successfully Barred from
Inheriting in Many Cases
There are instances where courts bar parents from inheriting in
the event they maltreated their child before their untimely death.
199
Therefore, UPC section 2-114 has been successful in limited
circumstances in fulfilling its purpose of barring these types of
parents from inheriting. However, cases that allow “bad parents” to
inherit are not simply outliers.
200
It is hard to consider these rulings
outliers when they occur time and time again across various
states.
201
While, admittedly, decisions in favor of abusive or
neglectful parents are not common, they still feed into the legal
maxim of “hard cases mak[ing] bad law.”
202
In other words,
complex cases such as these force judges into making difficult
decisions, which can have negative consequences on the future by
setting improper precedent.
203
For example, the court in Estate of
198
See supra Parts II & III.
199
See supra Section II.A.
200
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see Scalise,
Jr., supra note 15, at 192 (“Instead, the purpose is to [e]nsure the acceptance of
parental obligations for the child and to punish those who fail to do so. Bad parent
statutes affirmatively cut off inheritance rights even after one has established the
parental link.”); see also Crosby, 528 So. 2d at 1143 (allowing a father accused
of physical, mental, and sexual abuse of his daughter to share in the proceeds of a
wrongful death settlement); Fisher, 128 A.3d at 217 (allowing a father who
allegedly abandoned his son to inherit from his son’s estate).
201
See Crosby, 528 So. 2d at 1143; Fisher, 128 A.3d at 217.
202
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (“Great
cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason
of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment.”).
203
Furthermore, while at times judges need for their work the
training of economists of statesmen, and must act in view of
their foresight of consequences, yet, when their task is to
interpret and apply the words of a statute, their function is
merely academic to begin with—to read English intelligently—
and a consideration of consequences comes into play, if at all,
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McCoy ex rel. Jones v. McCoy stated that it did not believe the
legislature viewed non-financial support as “supporting the child”
in accordance with the Mississippi statute.
204
Going forward, this
precedent may prevent inheritance by a loving father who
emotionally supports his child but does not have the economic
means to support him or her financially.
205
Therefore, decisions that
allow “bad” parents to inherit and those that deny perhaps good
parents from inheriting, though they may be few in number, still
have a ripple effect on the states that the UPC should address
through increased clarity in its text and comments.
206
B. Few Abused Children Die with Substantial Estates,
Making This an Uncommon but Important Issue
For section 2-114 of the UPC to take effect, the child must have
(a) died (b) before the age of eighteen and (c) faced maltreatment
207
from a parent “immediately before the child’s death.”
208
While this
may be considered a rare circumstance, it still happens.
209
And not
only does it happen, but the resulting decisions have worked in favor
only when the meaning of the words used is open to reasonable
doubt.
Id. at 401.
204
Estate of McCoy v. ex rel Jones v. McCoy, 988 So. 2d 929, 933 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008).
205
See id. at 933.
206
See Crosby v. Corley, 528 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala. 1988); In re Estate of
Fisher, 128 A.3d 203, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015); see also Northern
Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 400 (representing the legal maxim that “great cases like hard
cases make bad law”).
207
UPC § 2-114 specifies that there must be “clear and convincing evidence
that immediately before the child’s death the parental rights of the parent could
have been terminated under law of this state other than this [code] on the basis of
nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect or other actions or inactions of the
parent toward the child.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010).
208
See id.
209
See McCoy, 988 So. 2d at 933 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); In re Turpening v.
Howard, 671 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Fisher, 128 A.3d at 214–
15.
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of the abusive or neglectful parent.
210
Statistics can help shine a light
on the possible real-life numbers of these circumstances: in 2015,
there were 4,044 accidental deaths in the United States for children
ages fourteen and younger with 12,514 deaths of those between ages
fifteen and twenty-four.
211
While the National Vital Statistics Report
does not break down this age group by individual years, making it
uncertain how many minors between the ages of fifteen and
seventeen die from accidents, one can extrapolate from the data that
there are several thousand accidental deaths of children under the
age of eighteen.
212
Furthermore, a separate National Vital Statistics
Report revealed that there was a recent increase in injury-related
deaths
213
between 2013 and 2016 of individuals between the ages of
ten and nineteen.
214
Taken together, it is evident that the several
thousands of accidental child deaths each year may be increasing,
which can invoke UPC section 2-114 and its progeny if any of these
additional children were subjected to maltreatment before their
untimely deaths.
215
This becomes even more concerning given the
potential rise in child maltreatment cases, which may present a
serious issue if there is overlap between the increasing accidental
child death population and increasing child maltreatment
population.
216
210
See Crosby, 528 So. 2d at 1144; Fisher, 128 A.3d at 217.
211
SeeMURPHY ET AL., supra note 151, at 33.
212
See id.
213
“Injury deaths” are organized by injury intent, which are classified as
unintentional, suicide, homicide, undetermined, and legal intervention/war. See
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 151, at 48.
214
SALLY C. CURTIN, M.A. ET AL., RECENT INCREASES IN INJURY
MORTALITY AMONG CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS AGED 10–19 YEARS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1999–2016 1 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr67/nvsr67_04.pdf.
215
See UNIF. PROBATECODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAWCOMM’N amended 2010);
CURTIN ET AL., supra note 214, at 1; MURPHY ET AL., supra note 151, at 33–34.
216
See CURTIN ET AL., supra note 214, at 1; see also Kimberly Key, Why is
Child Abuse on the Rise?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/counseling-keys/201611/why-is-
child-abuse-the-rise (There has been a “recent uptick” in child abuse in the United
States.); Child Maltreatment, supra note 177 (Certain types of maltreatment are
on the rise, such as “the proportion with reported neglect [which has] increased
from 49 percent in 1990 to 75 percent in 2017.”).
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Some research has confirmed a connection between
socioeconomic status and accidental deaths among children. A study
from Maine found that children who were on social welfare
programs “had an overall death rate 3.1 times greater” than those
who were not involved with these programs.
217
Specifically, these
lower-income children were 2.6 times more likely to die in an
accidental death than their counterparts.
218
This type of study has
been replicated in other parts of the country as well. A North
Carolina study found similar results, comparing families eligible to
receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) with
those not eligible.
219
This study revealed that children in families
eligible for AFDC were “3.1 times more likely to suffer death from
unintentional injuries, 2.3 times more likely to die from
drowning . . . and 1.4 times more likely to suffer a motor-vehicle
fatality.”
220
These statistics demonstrate that children of lower
socioeconomic backgrounds are at a greater risk of accidental death,
which can mean a stronger likelihood of triggering section 2-114
and a wrongful death suit.
Further, it can be argued that, even if the population size of
maltreated minors that die accidentally is potentially increasing,
221
the cost of a lawsuit may outweigh the size of an individual
decedent’s estate.
222
However, this is not always the case, especially
in the event of a wrongful death action.
223
These lawsuits can have
enormous payouts, which would substantially increase the size of
217
Nersesian et al., supra note 190.
218
Id.
219
Melvin D. Nelson, Jr., MBA, Socioeconomic Status and Childhood
Mortality in North Carolina, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1131, 1131 (1992).
220
Id. at 1131; see also Juhee Hong et al., Parental Socioeconomic Status
and Unintentional Injury Deaths in Early Childhood: Consideration of Injury
Mechanisms, Age at Death, and Gender, 42 ELSEVIER 313, 313 (2010) (“[T]he
risks of childhood injury deaths from traffic accidents, falls, and fire/burns were
associated with the [socioeconomic status] of the parents.”).
221
See CURTIN ET AL., supra note 214, at 1; see also Key, supra note 216
(noting the “recent uptick” in child abuse in the United States); Child
Maltreatment, supra note 177 (indicating how “reported neglect increased from
49 percent in 1990 to 75 percent in 2017”).
222
See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives,
73 IND. L.J. 59, 69 (1997).
223
See supra Section III.D.
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the estate for the decedent’s heirs.
224
Therefore, depending on the
circumstances of the child’s death, even if the estate is relatively
small, a wrongful death action could substantially alter its size,
making it worth pursuing, even by parents who never supported
their children in the first place.
225
C. Correlation Does Not Imply Causation
The various statistics on intestacy, child maltreatment, and
accidental deaths show correlations between variables, not causal
relationships.
226
Even though individuals with lower incomes
typically die intestate, it cannot be said that the lower income causes
intestacy.
227
Likewise, while many children who face maltreatment
tend to be from families of lower socioeconomic status, that does
not imply that lower socioeconomic status leads to maltreatment.
228
Without a causal link, it cannot definitively be said that UPC section
2-114 actually has a greater negative impact on lower income
families by being more permissive of abusive or neglectful parents’
inheritances.
229
However, it remains true that children from low
socioeconomic backgrounds suffer greater rates of abuse and
neglect than those of a higher socioeconomic status;
230
that children
from these backgrounds are more likely to die intestate than those
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds who are more likely to
have wills;
231
that children of lower socioeconomic status are at a
224
See supra Section III.B.
225
Id.
226
See supra Part III.
227
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 50.
228
See ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 454 (demonstrating that
“increases in income inequality are associated with increases in child
maltreatment rates at the county level” (emphasis added)).
229
UNIF. PROBATECODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAWCOMM’N 2010); see supra Part
III.
230
ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 454–55.
231
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 50.
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greater risk of dying accidentally;
232
and that 2-114 is likely to play
a relevant part in subsequent inheritance proceedings.
233
While it is true that the studies cited in this Note only
demonstrate associations between variables, these relationships still
show important connections, and it is possible that they can be
explained by the same phenomena.
234
For example, there is a
positive correlation between age and testacy, as well as between
income and testacy.
235
These two points can be explained by
multiple factors including a general increase in wealth from
childhood levels during adulthood,
236
the increased need or desire
for a will as one gets older and closer to death,
237
and the potentially
high costs associated with a lawyer drafting a will.
238
These
correlations are logically coherent and track human nature. Younger
individuals most likely do not create wills because they are either
not concerned about death at their age or do not hold the same values
about estate planning as older generations.
239
Because wills can be
costly, it is understandable that having a higher income would allow
somebody to afford the lawyer’s fees involved in drafting a will.
240
232
Nelson, Jr., supra note 219, at 1131; see also Hong et al., supra note 220
(confirming that “the risks of childhood injury deaths from traffic accidents, falls,
and fire/burns were associated with the [socioeconomic status] of the parents.”).
233
§ 2-114; see supra Part III.
234
Saul McLeod, Correlation, SIMPLY PSYCHOL.,
https://www.simplypsychology.org/correlation.html (last updated 2018)
(“Correlation means association—more precisely it is a measure of the extent to
which two variables are related.”); see supra Part III.
235
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 51–52.
236
Emmie Martin, Here’s How Much the Average American Earns at Every
Age, CBNC (Aug. 24, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/24/how-
much-americans-earn-at-every-age.html.
237
DiRusso, supra note 148, at 53–54 (“There is a good argument that estate
planning is most critical in the years between young married life and empty
nesthood, in the time during which people have financial dependents, particularly
young children.”).
238
Megan Leonhardt, 4 Things You Should Know Before You Make Your
Own Will, MONEY (Aug. 17, 2016), http://time.com/money/4443349/do-it-
yourself-will/ (“For a larger, more complex estate, with federal estate tax
considerations and specific trusts or entities such as family limited partnerships,
the price tag will be $1,000 or more.”).
239
See DiRusso, supra note 148, at 53–54.
240
See Leonhardt, supra note 238.
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Regardless of the explanation, the relationships between intestacy,
child maltreatment, and accidental deaths need not be causally
connected to demonstrate a valuable link.
241
Understanding these
correlations is critical for ensuring justice for abused or neglected
individuals who die intestate by preventing their abusers from
benefitting financially from their deaths.
242
V. SOLUTIONS
While the UPC may have been enacted to create a more uniform
system and resolve intestacy related problems,
243
in practice, it has
failed to adequately address the issue of parental inheritance
following years of child maltreatment.
244
Moving forward, the
Uniform Law Commission should take steps to revise the UPC, such
as providing state legislatures with a more descriptive and less
controversial provision that will ensure abusive or neglectful parents
are unable to benefit from the pain they cause.
245
A more detailed
provision will leave less room for court interpretation, thereby
creating a more even and straightforward approach to handling these
cases.
246
A. A Push for More Research
Before addressing some of the potential revisions that should be
made to UPC section 2-114, the first step to resolving these issues
is to gather more information and research regarding the individuals
involved. As pointed out, the relationships between age and testacy,
income and testacy, and income and child maltreatment are
correlations, not causal connections.
247
Because the UPC contains
the default intestacy rules and UPC section 2-114 specifically deals
241
See supra Part III.
242
See supra Part IV.
243
See supra Section I.A.
244
See supra Part II.
245
See About Us, supra note 20 (“The [ULC] . . . provides states with non-
partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and
stability to critical areas of state statutory law.”).
246
See supra Section II.B.
247
See supra Part III.
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with the estates of maltreated children, researchers must conduct
studies to examine the relationships between age, income, testacy,
maltreatment, and wrongful deaths to determine if there are causal
connections between any of them.
248
Since the majority of states
require individuals to be at least eighteen years old to write a will
249
and most child deaths occur because of accidents,
250
it would be
useful to know how many of these accidental deaths happen to
children who faced maltreatment at the hands of a parent.
The challenge now is finding a way to obtain information
regarding child accidental deaths and children who were abused or
neglected. The 2014 American Academy of Pediatrics Study relied
on information from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data
System (“NCANDS”), which collects data from the fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico regarding cases of abuse and
neglect.
251
Additionally, the National Vital Statistics System is an
intergovernmental network that collects vital statistics in the United
States.
252
If these two groups worked together to establish a new
organization, they could form a joint force to collect more detailed
information about decedents’ demographics that researches could
utilize to draw more associations or causal connections and
formulate a cohesive policy around parental treatment and
inheritance. If such research were to reveal a connection between
accidental deaths and children of abuse or neglect, then
policymakers could focus on protecting these individuals from
further maltreatment. Organizations like NCANDS could then relay
this information to Congress and child abuse protection agencies
253
248
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); Carroll,
supra note 17, at 630–31.
249
Willing Staff, The Legal Requirements of a Will, WILLING,
https://willing.com/learn/legal-requirements-of-a-will.html (last updated Oct.
2018).
250
SeeMURPHY ET AL., supra note 151, at 33–34.
251
See ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 455; NCANDS, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/research-data-technology/reporting-
systems/ncands (last updated June 12, 2019).
252
National Vital Statistics System, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/index.htm (last reviewed Oct. 3
2018).
253
For instance, non-profit organizations such as Childhelp exist “to meet
the physical, emotional, educational, and spiritual needs of abused, neglected and
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to safeguard these children from further harm. Until these
relationships are further examined, researchers must continue to
study these connections, as posited by the American Academy of
Pediatrics study.
254
B. Setting a Standard for the Burden of Proof
UPC section 2-114 sets forth the following burden of proof:
“clear and convincing evidence that immediately before the child’s
death the parental rights of the parent could have been terminated
under law of this state other than this [code] on the basis of
nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or other actions or
inactions of the parent toward the child.”
255
Some states such as New Mexico adopted the exact wording of
UPC section 2-114,
256
as seen in Perry v. Williams, where the Court
of Appeals disregarded the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard and simply decided that the legislature’s intent and prior
precedent aimed to prevent neglectful parents from inheriting.
257
Alternatively, other states such as New Jersey have enacted similar
but inexact versions of the UPC.
258
The resulting cases’ divergent
outcomes can be blamed, at least in part, on the nonuniform
language of these intestacy statutes across states.
259
The UPC should also incorporate an approach like that of
Mississippi’s statute, where specific examples of neglect, abuse, and
maltreatment are provided in order to show situations where
parental rights should be terminated.
260
UPC section 2-114 states,
at-risk children.” The Childhelp Approach to Ending Child Abuse, CHILDHELP,
https://www.childhelp.org/childhelp-approach/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).
254
See ECKENRODE ET AL., supra note 150, at 454.
255
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
256
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114 (West 2019).
257
Perry v. Williams, 70 P.3d 1283, 1287–89 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
258
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-14.1 (West 2019).
259
Compare Perry, 70 P.3d at 1287, with In re Estate of Fisher, 128 A.3d
203, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
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(a) The parent has been medically diagnosed by a qualified
mental health professional with severe mental illness or
deficiency that is unlikely to change in a reasonable period of
time[;] . . . (f) The parent’s abusive or neglectful conduct has
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“parental rights of the parent could have been terminated . . . on the
basis of nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or other actions
or inactions of the parent toward the child,” but it does not define
any of these terms.
261
If the UPC drafters were to provide examples
of definitive circumstances in which parental rights could be
terminated, states would be pressured to revise their respective
parental-bar statutes to provide such specific examples, and courts
would be unable to be as deferential as they were in Perry.
262
C. Revising the Act
Based on the foregoing issues regarding the clarification of
terms and need for a lower burden of proof for the parent moving to
terminate parental rights, UPC section 2-114 should be revised to
read:
A parent is barred from inheriting from or through a
child of the parent if: (1) the parent’s parental rights
were terminated and the parent-child relationship
was not judicially reestablished; or (2) the child died
before reaching [eighteen] years of age and a
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that
immediately before the child’s death the parental
rights of the parent could have been terminated under
law of this state other than this [code] on the basis of
nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or other
actions or inactions of the parent toward the child
including, but not limited to, (A) missed or minimal
child support payments, (B) a medical diagnosis or
testimony from a health professional that the parent
caused, at least in part, an extreme and deep-seated antipathy
by the child toward the parent, or some other substantial erosion
of the relationship between the parent and child; (h)(i) The
parent has been convicted of any of the following offenses
against any child: 1. Rape of child under Section 97-3-65; 2.
Sexual battery of a child under Section 97-3-95(c); 3. Touching
a child for lustful purposes under Section 97-5-23.
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261
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is unable to care for the child, or (C) the parent
suffers from habitual alcoholism or drug addiction,
or has been imprisoned due to involvement with
drugs, inhibiting or preventing their ability to parent.
This revised language lowers the burden of proof from “clear and
convincing evidence” to “preponderance of the evidence” and
would prevent unjust inheritances that arose in prior case law with
more descriptive examples of maltreatment. This could have
prevented the court deciding In re Turpening v. Howard from going
through an entire statutory language analysis.
263
Because a
preponderance of the evidence standard likely would have been
satisfied in Turpening by the evidence that the father knew his
daughter existed, he could have been barred from recovery from the
start.
264
Section (2)(C) of the revised UPC provision could have set
an example for states to avoid the issue in Estate of McCoy ex rel
Jones v. McCoy, since the father there was sentenced to nine years
in jail for selling cocaine.
265
If New Jersey adopted this revised
version, the standard would still be preponderance of the evidence,
but the harsher mental state requiring a “clearly
manifested . . . settled purpose to permanently forego all parental
duties,” an improperly difficult mental state to prove, would be
eliminated.
266
The court in Perry could have come out with the same
result by a more direct means better reflective of the UPC’s intent
by using a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than an
analysis of precedent and legislative intent.
267
There, the father’s
nominal child support payments and minimal contact with his son
would have been enough to bar him from recovery under this
standard.
268
While no revisions or additions can possibly anticipate every
issue that might arise under this UPC provision, this proposed
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version is more forward-looking and anticipates courts’ inevitable
participation in child intestate succession. By providing examples of
maltreatment, state legislatures and, subsequently, state courts will
have a better description and greater understanding of scenarios
where a “bad” parent should be barred from inheriting. The
combination of this revised act, a new agency to work to prevent
child maltreatment, and both a push for more research and new
methods for collecting this research will serve the public’s best
interest and hinder abusive or neglectful parents from committing
atrocities and then reaping the monetary awards from their victims’
estates.
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Law Commission created the UPC to recommend
a model to improve state laws regarding the succession of property
when the owner dies.
269
Unfortunately, UPC section 2-114,
governing the parent-child relationship, fails in practice for its lack
of specificity and needs to be revised to prevent future lawsuits from
arising that may result in a “bad parent” inheriting from his or her
child’s estate.
270
Statistics surrounding those who unfortunately
need to turn to parental-barring statutes in these circumstances
reveal that this problem of abusive or neglectful parent inheritance
exists and prompts a need for more research on the subject in order
to explore these correlations further to ensure that no particular
demographic faces disproportionately greater instances of unjust
parental inheritance.
271
The creation of a new organization to
conduct the proposed research will help determine if state statutes
modelled after UPC section 2-114 are disproportionately affecting
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, and the provided revisions to
the uniform act will equip states with a clearer method of preventing
any further injustices from occurring. If the goal of intestate
succession is truly to comply with the wishes of the decedent,
272
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is time to ensure that abusers do not benefit from the victims of their
maltreatment.
